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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the asset-liability management under the mean-variance criterion.
The financial market consists of a risk-free bond and a stock whose price process is modeled
by a geometric Brownian motion. The liability of the investor is uncontrollable and is modeled
by another geometric Brownian motion. We consider a specific state-dependent risk aversion
which depends on a power function of the liability. By solving a flow of FBSDEs with bivariate
state process, we obtain the equilibrium strategy among all the open-loop controls for this time-
inconsistent control problem. It shows that the equilibrium strategy is a feedback control of the
liability.
Keywords: Asset-liability management; Mean-variance; Equilibrium strategy; Time-inconsistent
control problem; FBSDEs
1 Introduction
In the pioneer work Markowitz (1952), the author considered the portfolio selection under the well-
known mean-variance criterion and derived the analytical expression of the mean-variance efficient
frontier in the single-period model. This seminal work has become the foundation of modern port-
folio theory and has stimulated numerous extensions.
On the one hand, some researchers focus on studying the dynamic mean-variance portfolio se-
lection problem. Samuelson (1969) considered a discrete-time multi-period model. More recently,
by embedding the original problem into a stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ) control problem, Li and
Ng (2000) and Zhou and Li (2000) extended Markowitz’s work to a multi-period model and a
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continuous-time model, respectively. On the other hand, there are some works that consider a gen-
eralized financial market. An important and popular subject is the asset and liability management
problem, which studies the selection of portfolio while taking into account the liabilities of investors.
More specifically, in the asset and liability management, the surplus, i.e. the difference between asset
value and liability value, is considered.
Since it was proposed by Sharpe and Tint (1990) which considered a single-period model, there
is an increasing number of interests in the asset-liability management under the mean-variance cri-
teria. Keel and Müller (1995) studied the portfolio choice with liabilities and showed that liabilities
affect the efficient frontier. Adopting the embedding technique of Li and Ng (2000), Leippold et al.
(2004) derived an analytical optimal policy and efficient frontier for the multi-period asset-liability
management problem. The mean-variance asset-liability management in a continuous-time model
was investigated by Chiu and Li (2006) in which a stochastic LQ control problem was studied and
both the optimal strategy and the mean efficient frontier were obtained. Furthermore, in a regime-
switching framework, Chen et al. (2008) and Chen and Yang (2011) studied the mean-variance
asset-liability management in the continuous-time model and mule-period model, respectively. It is
worth to note that, all of these papers suggested that the liabilities were not controllable, which is
the main difference between the Markowitz’s problem and the asset-liability management.
It is well acknowledged that due to the existence of a non-linear function of the expectation in
the objective functional, the mean-variance portfolio selection problem in a multi-period framework
is time inconsistent in the sense that the Bellman optimality principle does not hold. Intuitively,
an optimal strategy obtained for the initial time may not be optimal for any latter time. This is the
so-called pre-committed strategy, i.e., the strategy that is only optimal for the initial time. Note that
in all the references we mentioned above (among others), only the pre-committed strategies have
been considered.
In Strotz (1955), the author proposed another approach to study the time inconsistent problem,
i.e., study the problem within a game theoretic framework by using Nash equilibrium points. Re-
cently, there is an increasing amount of attention in the time inconsistent control problem due to
the practical applications in the economics and finance. In Ekeland and Lazrak (2006) and Eke-
land and Pirvu (2008) which considered the optimal consumption and investment problem under
hyperbolic discounting, the authors provided the precise definition of the equilibrium concept in
continuous time for the first time. Following their idea, Björk and Murgoci (2010) studied the
time-inconsistent control problem in a general Markov framework, and derived the extended HJB
equation together with the verification theorem. Björk et al. (2012) studied the Markowitz’s prob-
lem with state-dependent risk aversion by utilizing the extended HJB equation obtained in Björk
and Murgoci (2010). They showed that the equilibrium control was dependent on the current state.
Considering a regime-switching model and with the assumption that the risk aversion depends on
the state of the regime, Wei et al. (2012) investigated the equilibrium strategy for the mean-variance
asset-liability management problem by using the extended HJB equation developed by Björk and
Murgoci (2010).
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In Ekeland and Lazrak (2006), Ekeland and Pirvu (2008) and the papers following their idea,
the equilibrium control was defined within the class of feedback controls. Considering the time-
inconsistent stochastic LQ control, Hu et al. (2012) defined the equilibrium control within the class
of open-loop controls, and derived a general sufficient condition for equilibriums through a flow of
forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). However, the general existence of
solutions to the flow of FBSDEs is an open problem. With the assumption that the state process
was scalar valued and all the coefficients were deterministic, Hu et al. (2012) showed that the flow
of FBSDEs could be reduced into several Riccati-like ordinary differential equations and the equi-
librium control could be obtained explicitly. Also considering the scalar valued state process, Hu
et al. (2012) dealt with the Markowitz’s problem with state-dependent risk aversion and stochastic
coefficients. Due to the difference between the definitions of equilibrium controls, their results were
rather different from those obtained in Björk and Murgoci (2010) and Björk et al. (2012).
Following the idea of Hu et al. (2012), we consider the time-inconsistent mean-variance asset-
liability management. Since the state process of our problem is bivariate, the solution to the flow
of FBSDEs in Hu et al. (2012) can not be directly adopted. We show that the flow of FBSDEs
of our problem can be solved explicitly and the (close-form) equilibrium strategy can be obtained.
There are some differences between this paper and Wei et al. (2012) which also studied the time-
inconsistent mean-variance asset-liability management. First, the definitions of equilibrium controls
are different. They are inherited from the differences between Hu et al. (2012) and Ekeland and
Pirvu (2008). Second, the risk aversion considered in this paper depends on the liability process (see
Remark 2.2), while the risk aversion in Wei et al. (2012) only depends on the state of regime and
it becomes constant when there is only one regime. Since the risk aversion is independent of the
surplus process, the equilibrium strategy in this paper is a feedback control of the liability process
which is similar to Wei et al. (2012). Although we use different definitions of the equilibrium strategy
from Wei et al. (2012), in a special case we get the same result with Wei et al. (2012) (see Remark
3.2).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, the defini-
tion of the equilibrium strategy and the flow of FBSDEs of our problem. In section 3 we derive the
solution to the flow of FBSDEs and the equilibrium strategy. Section 4 establishes the equilibrium
value function. Some numerical examples are illustrated in section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The model
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a fixed complete probability space on which two independent standard Brownian
motions W1(t) and W2(t) are defined. Let T > 0 be the fixed and finite time horizon and denote by
{Ft}t∈[0,T ] the augmented filtration generated by (W1(t),W2(t)).
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We introduce the following notation with n being a generic integer:
L2G(Ω;R
n) : the set of random variables ξ : (Ω,G)→ (Rn,B(Rn)) with E
[
|ξ|2
]
<+∞.
L2G(t,T ;R
n) : the set of {G}s∈[t,T ]-adapted processes { f (s)}s∈[t,T ]
with E
[∫ T
t
| f (s)|2 ds
]
<∞.
L2G(Ω;C(t,T,R
n)) : the set of continuous {G}s∈[t,T ]-adapted processes { f (s)}s∈[t,T ]
with E
 sup
s∈[t,T ]
| f (s)|2
 <∞.
In what follows, unless otherwise specified, we adopt bold-face letters to denote matrices and
vectors, and the transpose of a matrix or vector M is denoted by M′. Also, we denote by Mi j (or Mi)
the (i, j)-element (or the i-th element) of the matrix M (or the vector M).
We consider a financial market consisting of one bond and one stock within the time horizon
[0,T ]. The price of the risk-free bond B(t) satisfies
dB(t) = r(t)B(t)dt, B(0) = 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
The price of the stock P(t) is given by
dP(t) = P(t)
[
µ(t)dt +σ(t)dW1(t)
]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
where P(0) = p0 > 0.
Denote by L(t) the liability of the investor. We assume that the liability and the stock price are
correlated and the dynamics of liability is given by
dL(t) = L(t)
[
α(t)dt +ρ(t)β(t)dW1(t) +
√
1−ρ2(t)β(t)dW2(t)
]
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
where L(0) = l0 > 0 and ρ(t) ∈ [0,1] for all t ∈ [0,T ].
Let u(t) be the dollar amount invested in the stock at time t. Then the asset in the stock market
Z(t) evolves as
dZ(t) =
[
r(t)Z(t) + (µ(t)− r(t))u(t)]dt +σ(t)u(t)dW1(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
where Z(0) = z0. The surplus process for the asset-liability management is given by S (t) := Z(t)−L(t).
Then the dynamics of S (t) is
dS (t) =
[
r(t)S (t) +η(t)L(t) + θ(t)u(t)
]
dt +
[
σ(t)u(t)−ρ(t)β(t)L(t)]dW1(t)
−
√
1−ρ2(t)β(t)L(t)dW2(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
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where η(t) = r(t)−α(t), θ(t) = µ(t)− r(t) and S (0) = z0− l0 := s0.
Let X(t) = (S (t),L(t))′ be the bivariate state process and X(0) = x0 := (s0, l0)′. Thus we have
dX(t) =
[
A(t)X(t) + B′(t)u(t)
]
dt + [C1(t)X(t) + D(t)u(t)]dW1(t) + C2(t)X(t)dW2(t), (2.1)
where
A(t) =
r(t) η(t)0 α(t)
 , B(t) = (θ(t),0), C1(t) = 0 −ρ(t)β(t)0 ρ(t)β(t)
 , C2(t) = 0 −
√
1−ρ2(t)β(t)
0
√
1−ρ2(t)β(t)
 ,
and D(t) = (σ(t),0)′. We assume that A B,C1,C2 and D are bounded deterministic functions on
[0,T ] valued in R2×2, R1×2,R2×2,R2×2 and R2×1, respectively.
Definition 2.1. A strategy u is said to be admissible if u ∈ L2F (0,T ;R) such that SDE (2.1) has a
unique solution X ∈ L2F (Ω;C(0,T,R2)).
For the time-inconsistent control problem, we will consider the controlled state process starting
from time t ∈ [0,T ] and state xt ∈ L2F (Ω,R2):
dX(s) =
[
A(s)X(s) + B′(s)u(s)
]
ds + [C1(s)X(s) + D(s)u(s)]dW1(s) + C2(s)X(s)dW2(s), (2.2)
with X(t) = xt. Note that for any strategy u ∈ L2F (t,T ;R), SDE (2.2) admits a unique solution Xt,xt,u ∈
L2F (Ω;C(t,T,R
2)).
At any initial state (t,xt), the mean-variance cost functional is given by
J(t,xt;u) :=
1
2
Var t [S (T )]−
[
ω1L−λ(t) +ω2
]
Et [S (T )]
=
1
2
Et
[
S 2(T )
]
− 1
2
(Et [S (T )])2−
[
ω1L−λ(t) +ω2
]
Et [S (T )] , (2.3)
where u ∈ L2F (t,T ;R), (S ,L)′ = Xt,xt,u, ω1 , ω2 , λ are nonnegative constants, and Et[·] := E[· | Ft].
Remark 2.2. Note that 1
ω1L−λ(t)+ω2
is a state-dependent risk aversion of the investor. Taking ω1 ≥ 0
and λ ≥ 0 implies that the risk aversion increases with increasing liability which is reasonable for a
common investor. Noting that, with such a risk aversion, the investor is uniformly risk averse.
2.2 The equilibrium strategy
In this subsection, we introduce the equilibrium strategy to the time-inconsistent control problem.
We use the definition of the equilibrium strategy from Hu et al. (2012).
Definition 2.3. Let u∗ ∈ L2F (0,T ;R) be a given strategy and X∗ be the state process corresponding to
u∗. The strategy u∗ is called an equilibrium strategy if for any t ∈ [0,T ) and v ∈ L2Ft(Ω,R),
liminf
→0
J(t,X∗(t);ut,,v)− J(t,X∗(t);u∗)

≥ 0,
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where
ut,,v(s) := u∗(s) + v1s∈[t,t+], s ∈ [t,T ],
for any t ∈ [0,T ) and  > 0. The equilibrium value function is defined by
V(t,X∗(t)) := J(t,X∗(t);u∗). (2.4)
Although we have stated the difference between definitions of equilibrium strategy in Hu et al.
(2012) and Ekeland and Lazrak (2006) in previous section, they have similar intuition. We refer the
reader to these papers for more details.
Let u∗ be a fixed strategy and X∗ be the corresponding state process. For any t ∈ [0,T ), the adjoint
process (p(·; t), (k1(·; t),k2(·; t))) ∈ L2F (t,T ;R2)×
(
L2F (t,T ;R
2)
)2
is defined in the time interval [t,T ]
by dp(s; t) = −
[
A′(s)p(s; t) + C′1(s)k1(s; t) + C
′
2(s)k2(s; t)
]
ds +
∑2
i=1 ki(s; t)dWi(s), s ∈ [t,T ],
p(T ; t) = GX∗(T )−hEt [X∗(T )]−
[
ω1L−λ(t) +ω2
]
e,
(2.5)
where
G = h =
1 00 0
 , e = 10
 .
Note that the risk aversion in our model is different from Hu et al. (2012) in which the recip-
rocal of the risk aversion is a linear function of the state process. However, with p(s; t) defined by
(2.5), Proposition 3.1 in Hu et al. (2012) still holds for our model. Hence, we have the following
result which gives a sufficient condition of equilibrium strategies for our asset-liability management
problem.
Theorem 2.4. A strategy u∗ ∈ L2F (0,T ;R) is an equilibrium strategy if for any time t ∈ [0,T ]:
(i) the system of stochastic differential equations
dX∗(s) =
[
A(s)X∗(s) + B′(s)u∗(s)
]
ds + [C1(s)X∗(s) + D(s)u∗(s)]dW1(s) + C2(s)X∗(s)dW2(s),
X∗(0) = (s0, l0)′ ;
dp(s; t) = −
[
A′(s)p(s; t) + C′1(s)k1(s; t) + C
′
2(s)k2(s; t)
]
ds +
∑2
i=1 ki(s; t)dWi(s), s ∈ [t,T ],
p(T ; t) = GX∗(T )−hEt [X∗(T )]−
[
ω1L−λ(t) +ω2
]
e;
(2.6)
admits a solution (X∗,p, (k1,k2));
(ii) Λ(s; t) = B(s)p(s; t) + D′(s)k1(s; t) satisfies
Et
[∫ T
t
|Λ(s; t)|ds
]
<∞, lim
s↓t
Et [Λ(s; t)] = 0, a.s., ∀t ∈ [0,T ]. (2.7)
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As mentioned by Hu et al. (2012), under some condition, the second equality in (2.7) is ensured
by
B(t)p(t; t) + D′(t)k1(t, t) = 0. (2.8)
From the above theorem, if we can solve the flow of FBSDEs (2.6), then we can get the equilib-
rium strategy. However, the general result for the solution to a flow of FBSDEs is not available. In
the next section, we will solve the flow of FBSDEs (2.6) with bivariate state process.
3 The Equilibrium Strategy
3.1 The solution to the flow of FBSDEs (2.6)
Let p = (p1, p2)′,k1 = (k1,1,k1,2)′ and k2 = (k2,1,k2,2)′. We rewrite (2.6) and (2.8) as
dS ∗(s) =
[
r(s)S ∗(s) +η(s)L(s) + θ(s)u∗(s)
]
ds +
[
σ(s)u∗(s)−ρ(s)β(s)L(s)]dW1(s)
−√1−ρ2(s)β(s)L(s)dW2(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ T,
S ∗(0) = s0,
dL(s) = L(s)
[
α(s)ds +ρ(s)β(s)dW1(s) +
√
1−ρ2(s)β(s)dW2(s)
]
, 0 ≤ s ≤ T,
L(0) = l0,
dp1(s; t) = −r(s)p1(s; t)ds + k1,1(s; t)dW1(s) + k2,1(s; t)dW2(s), s ∈ [t,T ],
p1(T ; t) = S ∗(T )−Et [S ∗(T )]−
[
ω1L−λ(t) +ω2
]
,
dp2(s; t) = − {η(s)p1(s; t) +α(s)p2(s; t)−ρ(s)β(s) [k1,1(s; t)− k1,2(s; t)]
−√1−ρ2(s)β(s) [k2,1(s; t)− k2,2(s; t)]}
+k1,2(s; t)dW1(s) + k2,2(s; t)dW2(s), s ∈ [t,T ],
p2(T ; t) = 0
(3.1)
and
θ(t)p1(t; t) +σ(t)k1,1(t; t) = 0, (3.2)
respectively.
Similar to Hu et al. (2012), we consider the following ansatz:
p1(s; t) = M1(s)L−λ(s) + M2(s)S ∗(s) + M3(s)L(s)
+M4(s)Et
[
L−λ(s)
]
+ M5(s)Et
[
S ∗(s)
]
+ M6(s)Et [L(s)]
+M7(s)L−λ(t) + M8(s)S ∗(t) + M9(s)L(t) + M10(s), (3.3)
p2(s; t) = N1(s)L−λ(s) + N2(s)S ∗(s) + N3(s)L(s)
+N4(s)Et
[
L−λ(s)
]
+ N5(s)Et
[
S ∗(s)
]
+ N6(s)Et [L(s)]
+N7(s)L−λ(t) + N8(s)S ∗(t) + N9(s)L(t) + N10(s), (3.4)
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where Mi and Ni, i = 1, · · · ,10, are deterministic differentiable functions with M˙i = mi and N˙i = ni,
i = 1, · · · ,10. In the following, we get the solutions to Mi, i = 1, · · · ,10. The derivation for Ni, i =
1, · · · ,10 are similar, and since they will not appear in the equilibrium strategy or the equilibrium
value function, we omit the details.
By Itô’s formula, it is easy to see that
dL−λ(s) = −λL−(λ+1)(s)dL(s) + 1
2
λ(λ+ 1)L−(λ+2)(s)d[L,L](s)
= −λL−λ(s)
{[
α(s)− 1
2
(λ+ 1)β2(s)
]
ds +
[
ρ(s)β(s)dW1(s) +
√
1−ρ2(s)β(s)dW2(s)
]}
.
Consequently, we have
dp1(s; t) = m1(s)L−λ(s)ds−λM1(s)L−λ(s)
[
α(s)− 1
2
(λ+ 1)β2(s)
]
ds
−λM1(s)L−λ(s)
[
ρ(s)β(s)dW1(s) +
√
1−ρ2(s)β(s)dW2(s)
]
+m2(s)S ∗(s)ds + M2(s)
[
r(s)S ∗(s) +η(s)L(s) + θ(s)u∗(s)
]
ds
+M2(s)
{[
σ(s)u∗(s)−ρ(s)β(s)L(s)]dW1(s)− √1−ρ2(s)β(s)L(s)dW2(s)}
+m3(s)L(s)ds + M3(s)L(s)
[
α(s)ds +ρ(s)β(s)dW1(s) +
√
1−ρ2(s)β(s)dW2(s)
]
+m4(s)Et
[
L−λ(s)
]
ds−λ
[
α(s)− 1
2
(λ+ 1)β2(s)
]
M4(s)Et
[
L−λ(s)
]
ds
+m5(s)Et
[
S ∗(s)
]
ds + M5(s)Et
[
r(s)S ∗(s) +η(s)L(s) + θ(s)u∗(s)
]
ds
+m6(s)Et [L(s)]ds +α(s)M6(s)Et [L(s)]ds
+m7(s)L−λ(t)ds + m8(s)S ∗(t)ds + m9(s)L(t)ds + m10(s)ds. (3.5)
Comparing the dW1(s)-term and dW2(s)-term in (3.5) and (3.1), we obtain
k1,1(s; t) = −λρ(s)β(s)M1(s)L−λ(s) + M2(s) [σ(s)u∗(s)−ρ(s)β(s)L(s)]
+ρ(s)β(s)M3(s)L(s),
k2,1(s; t) = −λ
√
1−ρ2(s)β(s)M1(s)L−λ(s)−
√
1−ρ2(s)β(s)M2(s)L(s)
+
√
1−ρ2(s)β(s)M3(s)L(s).
(3.6)
Putting p1 and k11 into (3.2), it yields that
θ(s)
{
M1(s)L−λ(s) + M2(s)S ∗(s) + M3(s)L(s)
+M4(s)L−λ(s) + M5(s)S ∗(s) + M6(s)L(s)
+M7(s)L−λ(s) + M8(s)S ∗(s) + M9(s)L(s) + M10(s)
}
+σ(s)
{
−ρ(s)β(s)
[
λM1(s)L−λ(s) + (M2(s)−M3(s)) L(s)
]
+σ(s)M2(s)u∗(s)
}
= 0,
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i.e.
{θ(s) [M1(s) + M4(s) + M7(s)]−λσ(s)ρ(s)β(s)M1(s)}L−λ(s)
+θ(s) [M2(s) + M5(s) + M8(s)]S ∗(s)
{θ(s) [M3(s) + M6(s) + M9(s)]−σ(s)ρ(s)β(s) [M2(s)−M3(s)]}L(s)
+θ(s)M10(s) +σ2(s)M2(s)u∗(s) = 0,
which implies
u∗(s) = f1(s)L−λ(s) + f2(s)S ∗(s) + f3(s)L(s) + f4(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ T,
where 
f1(s) = − θ(s)[M1(s)+M4(s)+M7(s)]−λσ(s)ρ(s)β(s)M1(s)σ2(s)M2(s) ,
f2(s) = − θ(s)[M2(s)+M5(s)+M8(s)]σ2(s)M2(s) ,
f3(s) = − θ(s)[M3(s)+M6(s)+M9(s)]−σ(s)ρ(s)β(s)[M2(s)−M3(s)]σ2(s)M2(s) ,
f4(s) = − θ(s)M10(s)σ2(s)M2(s) .
(3.7)
Comparing the ds-term of p1(s; t) in (3.1) and (3.5), we get
r(s)
{
M1(s)L−λ(s) + M2(s)S ∗(s) + M3(s)L(s)
+M4(s)Et
[
L−λ(s)
]
+ M5(s)Et
[
S ∗(s)
]
+ M6(s)Et [L(s)]
+M7(s)L−λ(t) + M8(s)S ∗(t) + M9(s)L(t) + M10(s)
}
+m1(s)L−λ(s)−λ
[
α(s)− 1
2
(λ+ 1)β2(s)
]
M1(s)L−λ(s)
+m2(s)S ∗(s) + M2(s)
[
r(s)S ∗(s) +η(s)L(s) + θ(s)u∗(s)
]
+m3(s)L(s) +α(s)M3(s)L(s)
+m4(s)Et
[
L−λ(s)
]
−λ
[
α(s)− 1
2
(λ+ 1)β2(s)
]
M4(s)Et
[
L−λ(s)
]
+m5(s)Et
[
S ∗(s)
]
+ M5(s)Et
[
r(s)S ∗(s) +η(s)L(s) + θ(s)u∗(s)
]
+m6(s)Et [L(s)] +α(s)M6(s)Et [L(s)]
+m7(s)L−λ(t) + m8(s)S ∗(t) + m9(s)L(t) + m10(s) = 0,
i.e., {
m1(s) +
(
r(s)−λ
[
α(s)− 1
2
(λ+ 1)β2(s)
])
M1(s)
}
L−λ(s)
+ {m2(s) + 2r(s)M2(s)}S ∗(s)
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+ {m3(s) + [r(s) +α(s)] M3(s) +η(s)M2(s)}L(s)
+
{
m4(s) +
(
r(s)−λ
[
α(s)− 1
2
(λ+ 1)β2(s)
])
M4(s)
}
Et
[
L−λ(s)
]
{m5(s) + 2r(s)M5(s)}Et [S ∗(s)]
{m6(s) + [r(s) +α(s)] M6(s) +η(s)M5(s)}Et [L(s)]
+ {m7(s) + r(s)M7(s)}L−λ(t) + {m8(s) + r(s)M8(s)}S ∗(t)
+ {m9(s) + r(s)M9(s)}L(t) + m10(s) + r(s)M10(s)
+θ(s)M2(s)
[
f1(s)L−λ(s) + f2(s)S ∗(s) + f3(s)L(s) + f4(s)
]
+θ(s)M5(s)Et
[
f1(s)L−λ(s) + f2(s)S ∗(s) + f3(s)L(s) + f4(s)
]
= 0.
Putting (3.7) into the above equation, we have{
m1(s) +
(
r(s)−λ
[
α(s)− 1
2
(λ+ 1)β2(s)
])
M1(s)
−θ
2(s) [M1(s) + M4(s) + M7(s)]−λθ(s)σ(s)ρ(s)β(s)M1(s)
σ2(s)
}
L−λ(s)
+
{
m2(s) + 2r(s)M2(s)− θ
2(s) [M2(s) + M5(s) + M8(s)]
σ2(s)
}
S ∗(s)
+ {m3(s) + [r(s) +α(s)] M3(s) +η(s)M2(s)
−θ
2(s) [M3(s) + M6(s) + M9(s)]− θ(s)σ(s)ρ(s)β(s) [M2(s)−M3(s)]
σ2(s)
}
L(s)
+
{
m4(s) +
(
r(s)−λ
[
α(s)− 1
2
(λ+ 1)β2(s)
])
M4(s)
−M5(s)θ
2(s) [M1(s) + M4(s) + M7(s)]−λθ(s)σ(s)ρ(s)β(s)M1(s)
M2(s)σ2(s)
}
Et
[
L−λ(s)
]
+
{
m5(s) + 2r(s)M5(s)−M5(s)θ
2(s) [M2(s) + M5(s) + M8(s)]
M2(s)σ2(s)
}
Et
[
S ∗(s)
]
+ {m6(s) + [r(s) +α(s)] M6(s) +η(s)M5(s)
−M5(s)θ
2(s) [M3(s) + M6(s) + M9(s)]− θ(s)σ(s)ρ(s)β(s) [M2(s)−M3(s)]
M2(s)σ2(s)
}
Et [L(s)]
+ {m7(s) + r(s)M7(s)}L−λ(t) + {m8(s) + r(s)M8(s)}S ∗(t) + {m9(s) + r(s)M9(s)}L(t)
+m10(s) + r(s)M10(s)− θ
2(s)M10(s)
σ2(s)
−M5(s)θ
2(s)M10(s)
M2(s)σ2(s)
= 0. (3.8)
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From (3.8), we can get the following equations for Mi, i = 1, · · · ,10:
m1(s) +
(
r(s)−λ
[
α(s)− 12 (λ+ 1)β2(s)
])
M1(s)
− θ2(s)[M1(s)+M4(s)+M7(s)]−λθ(s)σ(s)ρ(s)β(s)M1(s)
σ2(s) = 0, s ∈ [0,T ],
M1(T ) = 0;
(3.9)
m2(s) + 2r(s)M2(s)−
θ2(s)[M2(s)+M5(s)+M8(s)]
σ2(s) = 0, s ∈ [0,T ],
M2(T ) = 1;
(3.10)

m3(s) + [r(s) +α(s)] M3(s) +η(s)M2(s)
− θ2(s)[M3(s)+M6(s)+M9(s)]−θ(s)σ(s)ρ(s)β(s)[M2(s)−M3(s)]
σ2(s) = 0, s ∈ [0,T ],
M3(T ) = 0;
(3.11)

m4(s) +
(
r(s)−λ
[
α(s)− 12 (λ+ 1)β2(s)
])
M4(s)
−M5(s) θ
2(s)[M1(s)+M4(s)+M7(s)]−λθ(s)σ(s)ρ(s)β(s)M1(s)
M2(s)σ2(s)
= 0, s ∈ [0,T ],
M4(T ) = 0;
(3.12)
m5(s) + 2r(s)M5(s)−M5(s)
θ2(s)[M2(s)+M5(s)+M8(s)]
M2(s)σ2(s)
= 0, s ∈ [0,T ],
M5(T ) = −1;
(3.13)

m6(s) + [r(s) +α(s)] M6(s) +η(s)M5(s)
−M5(s) θ
2(s)[M3(s)+M6(s)+M9(s)]−θ(s)σ(s)ρ(s)β(s)[M2(s)−M3(s)]
M2(s)σ2(s)
= 0, s ∈ [0,T ],
M6(T ) = 0;
(3.14)
m7(s) + r(s)M7(s) = 0, s ∈ [0,T ],M7(T ) = −ω1; (3.15)m8(s) + r(s)M8(s) = 0, s ∈ [0,T ],M8(T ) = 0; (3.16)m9(s) + r(s)M9(s) = 0, s ∈ [0,T ],M9(T ) = 0; (3.17)m10(s) + r(s)M10(s)−
θ2(s)M10(s)
σ2(s) −M5(s)
θ2(s)M10(s)
M2(s)σ2(s)
= 0, s ∈ [0,T ],
M10(T ) = −ω2.
(3.18)
In the rest of this subsection, we focus on solving ODEs (3.9)-(3.18). First, from ODEs (3.15)-
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(3.17), it is easy to see that
M7(s) = −ω1e
∫ T
s r(y)dy, M8(s) = M9(s) ≡ 0, (3.19)
for 0 ≤ s ≤ T .
Second, it follows from (3.10) and (3.13) that M2(s) = −M5(s), for 0 ≤ s ≤ T . Consequently, we
have
M2(s) = e
∫ T
s 2r(y)dy, M5(s) = −e
∫ T
s 2r(y)dy. (3.20)
Putting (3.20) into (3.18) yields that
M10(s) = −ω2e
∫ T
s r(y)dy. (3.21)
With (3.19) and (3.20), we can get (M1,M4) and (M3,M6) from the systems of ODEs
m1(s) +
(
r(s)−λ
[
α(s)− 12 (λ+ 1)β2(s)
]
− θ2(s)−λθ(s)σ(s)ρ(s)β(s)
σ2(s)
)
M1(s)
− θ2(s)
σ2(s) M4(s)−
θ2(s)
σ2(s) M7(s) = 0, s ∈ [0,T ],
m4(s) +
(
r(s)−λ
[
α(s)− 12 (λ+ 1)β2(s)
]
+
θ2(s)
σ2(s)
)
M4(s)
+
θ2(s)−λθ(s)σ(s)ρ(s)β(s)
σ2(s) M1(s) +
θ2(s)
σ2(s) M7(s) = 0, s ∈ [0,T ],
M1(T ) = 0, M4(T ) = 0
(3.22)
and 
m3(s) +
[
r(s) +α(s)− θ2(s)+θ(s)σ(s)ρ(s)β(s)
σ2(s)
]
M3(s)− θ2(s)σ2(s) M6(s)
+
[
η(s) + θ(s)ρ(s)β(s)σ(s)
]
M2(s) = 0, s ∈ [0,T ],
m6(s) +
[
r(s) +α(s) + θ
2(s)
σ2(s)
]
M6(s) +
θ2(s)+θ(s)σ(s)ρ(s)β(s)
σ2(s) M3(s)
−
[
η(s) + θ(s)ρ(s)β(s)σ(s)
]
M2(s) = 0, s ∈ [0,T ],
M3(T ) = 0, M6(T ) = 0,
(3.23)
respectively. It follows from (3.22) and (3.23) that
M1(s) = −M4(s)
= exp
{∫ T
s
(
r(y)−λ
[
α(y)− 1
2
(λ+ 1)β2(y)
]
+
λθ(y)ρ(y)β(y)
σ(y)
)
dy
}
×
∫ T
s
exp
{
−
∫ T
z
(
r(y)−λ
[
α(y)− 1
2
(λ+ 1)β2(y)
]
+
λθ(y)ρ(y)β(y)
σ(y)
)
dy
}[
− θ
2(z)
σ2(z)
M7(z)
]
dz
= ω1e
∫ T
s r(y)dy
∫ T
s
exp
{∫ s
z
(
λ
[
α(y)− 1
2
(λ+ 1)β2(y)
]
− λθ(y)ρ(y)β(y)
σ(y)
)
dy
}
θ2(z)
σ2(z)
dz, (3.24)
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and
M3(s) = −M6(s)
= exp
{∫ T
s
[
r(y) +α(y)− θ(y)ρ(y)β(y)
σ(y)
]
dy
}
×
∫ T
s
exp
{
−
∫ T
z
[
r(y) +α(y)− θ(y)ρ(y)β(y)
σ(y)
]
dy
}[
η(z) +
θ(z)ρ(z)β(z)
σ(z)
]
M2(z)dz
= e
∫ T
s 2r(y)dy
∫ T
s
exp
{∫ s
z
[
η(y) +
θ(y)ρ(y)β(y)
σ(y)
]
dy
}[
η(z) +
θ(z)ρ(z)β(z)
σ(z)
]
dz, (3.25)
respectively.
3.2 The equilibrium strategy
From (3.7) and the results given by last subsection, we have
f1(s) = −θ(s)M7(s)−λσ(s)ρ(s)β(s)M1(s)
σ2(s)M2(s)
,
f2(s) = 0,
f3(s) =
ρ(s)β(s)
σ(s)
[
1− M3(s)
M2(s)
]
,
f4(s) = − θ(s)M10(s)
σ2(s)M2(s)
.
Theorem 3.1. Let
M2(s) = e
∫ T
s 2r(y)dy, M7(s) = −ω1e
∫ T
s r(y)dy, M10(s) = −ω2e
∫ T
s r(y)dy,
M1 and M3 be given by (3.24) and (3.25), respectively. Then the strategy defined by
u∗(s) = f1(s)L−λ(s) + f3(s)L(s) + f4(s)
is an equilibrium strategy.
Proof. Define p1, p2 and (k1,k2) by (3.3), (3.4) and (3.6), respectively. Obviously, (u∗,X∗,p, (k1,k2))
satisfies the system (2.6). Furthermore, it is easy to see that f1(s), f3(s) and f4(s) are uniformly
bounded. Thus, we have X∗ ∈ L2F (Ω;C(0,T,R2)) and u∗ ∈ L2F (0,T ;R).
Now, we are going to check whether the condition (2.7) is satisfied. Note that
Λ(s; t) = θ(s)p1(s; t) +σ(s)k1,1(s; t)
= θ(s)
{
M1(s)L−λ(s) + M2(s)S ∗(s) + M3(s)L(s)
−M1(s)Et
[
L−λ(s)
]
−M2(s)Et [S ∗(s)]
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−M3(s)Et [L(s)] + M7(s)L−λ(t) + M10(s)
}
+σ(s)
{
−λρ(s)β(s)M1(s)L−λ(s) + M2(s) [σ(s)u∗(s)−ρ(s)β(s)L(s)]
+ρ(s)β(s)M3(s)L(s)}
= θ(s)M1(s)
[
L−λ(s)−Et
[
L−λ(s)
]]
+ θ(s)M2(s)
[
S ∗(s)−Et [S ∗(s)]]
+θ(s)M3(s) [L(s)−Et [L(s)]] + θM7(s)
[
L−λ(t)−L−λ(s)
]
.
Obviously, Λ satisfies the first condition in (2.7). It follows from
lim
s↓t
Et
[∣∣∣∣L−λ(s)−Et [L−λ(s)]∣∣∣∣] = 0, and lim
s↓t
Et
[∣∣∣L−λ(s)−L−λ(t)∣∣∣] = 0,
lim
s↓t
Et
[∣∣∣X∗(s)−Et [X∗(s)]∣∣∣] = 0, and lim
s↓t
Et
[∣∣∣X∗(s)−X∗(t)∣∣∣] = 0
that Λ satisfies the second condition in (2.7). 
Remark 3.2. Although we are looking for the equilibrium strategy u∗ among the open-loop controls,
it is a feedback control of L−λ and L. Recall that the equilibrium strategy obtained in Wei et al.
(2012) is only a linear feedback control of the liability. The results are different because the risk
aversion considered in this paper depends on L−λ, while a constant risk aversion is considered in
Wei et al. (2012) if there is only one regime.
If ω1 = 0, then
f1(s) = 0,
f3(s) =
ρ(s)β(s)
σ(s)
[
1− M3(s)
M2(s)
]
,
f4(s) = − θ(s)M10(s)
σ2(s)M2(s)
,
which means that equilibrium strategy u∗ always depends on the liability, even if the risk aversion is
independent of the liability. Furthermore, it is interesting that we get the same equilibrium strategy
with Wei et al. (2012) in this special case (see Appendix).
4 The Equilibrium Value Function
In this section, we are going to derive the equilibrium value function V which is defined by (2.4). The
techniques are similar to Chiu and Li (2006). To simplify the notation, we suppress the superscript
of S ∗.
We can rewrite S by
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
dS (s) =
{
r(s)S (s) +
[
η(s) + θ(s) f3(s)
]
L(s) + θ(s) f1(s)L−λ(s) + θ(s) f4(s)
}
ds
+
{[
σ(s) f3(s)−ρ(s)β(s)]L(s) +σ(s) f1(s)L−λ(s) +σ(s) f4(s)}dW1(s)
−√1−ρ2(s)β(s)L(s)dW2(s),
S (0) = s0.
Recall that dL(s) = L(s)
[
α(s)ds +ρ(s)β(s)dW1(s) +
√
1−ρ2(s)β(s)dW2(s)
]
,
L(0) = l0.
Let ξ(s,q) := θ(s) + qσ(s)ρ(s)β(s), for all q ∈ R. Then for all q ∈ R applying the Itô formula, we
derive the following SDEs for Lq, S Lq, and S 2:dL
q(s) = qLq(s)
{[
α(s)− 12 (1−q)β2(s)
]
ds +
[
ρ(s)β(s)dW1(s) +
√
1−ρ2(s)β(s)dW2(s)
]}
,
Lq(0) = lq0; 
dS (s)Lq(s) =
{[
r(s) + q
[
α(s)− 12 (1−q)β2(s)
]]
S (s)Lq(s)
+
[
η(s) + ξ(s,q) f3(s)−qβ2(s)
]
Lq+1(s)
+ξ(s,q) f1(s)L−λ+q(s)
+ξ(s,q) f4(s)Lq(s)}ds
+(· · · )dW1(s) + (· · · )dW2(s),
S (0)Lq(0) = s0l
q
0;
dS 2(s) =
{
2r(s)S 2(s) + 2θ(s) f4(s)S (s)
+2 {η(s) + θ(s) f3(s)}S (s)L(s)
+
[
σ2(s) f 23 (s)−2ρ(s)β(s)σ(s) f3(s) +β2(s)
]
L2(s)
+2θ(s) f1(s)S (s)L−λ(s) +σ2(s) f 21 (s)L
−2λ(s)
+2σ(s)
[
σ(s) f3(s)−ρ(s)β(s)] f1(s)L−λ+1(s)
+2σ2(s) f1(s) f4(s)L−λ(s)
+ 2σ(s)
[
σ(s) f3(s)−ρ(s)β(s)] f4(s)L(s) + [σ(s) f4(s)]2}ds
+(· · · )dW1(s) + (· · · )dW2(s),
S 2(0) = s20.
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Therefore, for s ∈ [t,T ] and q ∈ R we obtaindEt [L
q(s)] = q
[
α(s)− 12 (1−q)β2(s)
]
Et [Lq(s)]ds,
Et [Lq(t)] = l
q
t ;
(4.1)

dEt[S (s)] =
{
r(s)Et[S (s)] +
[
η(s) + θ(s) f3(s)
]
Et[L(s)]
+θ(s) f1(s)Et
[
L−λ(s)
]
+ θ(s) f4(s)
}
ds,
Et[S (t)] = st;
(4.2)

dEt [S (s)Lq(s)] =
{[
r(s) + q
[
α(s)− 12 (1−q)β2(s)
]]
Et [S (s)Lq(s)]
+
[
η(s) + ξ(s,q) f3(s)−qβ2(s)
]
Et
[
Lq+1(s)
]
+ξ(s,q) f1(s)Et
[
L−λ+q(s)
]
+ξ(s,q) f4(s)Et [Lq(s)]}ds
+(· · · )dW1(s) + (· · · )dW2(s),
Et [S (t)Lq(t)] = stl
q
t ;
(4.3)
and 
dEt[S 2(s)] =
{
2r(s)Et[S 2(s)] + 2θ(s) f4(s)Et[S (s)]
+2
[
η(s) + θ(s) f3(s)
]
Et[S (s)L(s)]
+
[
σ2(s) f 23 (s)−2ρ(s)β(s)σ(s) f3(s) +β2(s)
]
Et[L2(s)]
+2θ(s) f1(s)Et
[
S (s)L−λ(s)
]
+σ2(s) f 21 (s)Et
[
L−2λ(s)
]
+2σ(s)
[
σ(s) f3(s)−ρ(s)β(s)] f1(s)Et [L−λ+1(s)]
+2σ2(s) f1(s) f4(s)Et
[
L−λ(s)
]
+ 2σ(s)
[
σ(s) f3(s)−ρ(s)β(s)] f4(s)Et[L(s)] + [σ(s) f4(s)]2}ds,
Et[S 2(t)] = s2t .
(4.4)
Then solving ODEs (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3), we obtain
Et
[
Lq(T )
]
= lqt e
∫ T
t q
[
α(y)− 12 (1−q)β2(y)
]
dy; (4.5)
Et [S (T )] = ste
∫ T
t r(y)dy + S˜ I(t,T )Et[L(T )] + S˜ II(t,T )Et
[
L−λ(T )
]
+ S˜ III(t,T ), (4.6)
where
S˜ I(t,T ) =
∫ T
t
[
η(v) + θ(v) f3(v)
]
e
∫ T
v η(y)dydv,
S˜ II(t,T ) =
∫ T
t
θ(v) f1(v)e
∫ T
v
[
r(y)+λα(y)− 12λ(λ+1)β2(y)
]
dydv,
S˜ III(t,T ) =
∫ T
t
θ(v) f4(v)e
∫ T
v r(y)dydv;
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and
Et[S (T )Lq(T )] = stl
q
t e
∫ T
t
{
r(y)+q
[
α(y)− 12 (1−q)β2(y)
]}
dy
+ S˜ LI(t,T,q)Et
[
Lq+1(T )
]
+ S˜ LII(t,T,q)Et
[
L−λ+q(T )
]
+ S˜ LIII(t,T,q)Et
[
Lq(T )
]
,
where
S˜ LI(t,T,q) =
∫ T
t
[
η(v) + ξ(v,q) f3(v)−qβ2(v)
]
e
∫ T
v
[
η(y)−qβ2(y)
]
dydv,
S˜ LII(t,T,q) =
∫ T
t
ξ(v,q) f1(v)e
∫ T
v
[
r(y)+λα(y)− 12λ(λ−2q+1)β2(y)
]
dydv,
S˜ LIII(t,T,q) =
∫ T
t
ξ(v,q) f4(v)e
∫ T
v r(y)dydv.
Then (4.4) can be rewritten by
dEt[S 2(s)] =
{
2r(s)Et[S 2(s)] + F(t, s)Et[L(s)] +G(t, s)Et[L2(s)] + H(t, s)Et
[
L−λ(s)
]
+J(t, s)Et
[
L−λ+1(s)
]
+ K(t, s)Et
[
L−2λ(s)
]
+ M(t, s)
}
ds,
Et[S 2(t)] = s2t ,
(4.7)
where
F(t, s) = 2θ(s) f4(s)S˜ I(t, s) + 2
[
η(s) + θ(s) f3(s)
]
S˜ LIII(t, s,1) + 2σ(s)
[
σ(s) f3(s)−ρ(s)β(s)] f4(s),
G(t, s) = 2
[
η(s) + θ(s) f3(s)
]
S˜ LI(t, s,1) +
[
σ2(s) f 23 (s)−2ρ(s)β(s)σ(s) f3(s) +β2(s)
]
,
H(t, s) = 2θ(s) f4(s)S˜ II(t, s) + 2θ(s) f1(s)S˜ LIII(t, s,−λ) + 2σ2(s) f1(s) f4(s),
J(t, s) = 2
[
η(s) + θ(s) f3(s)
]
S˜ LII(t, s,1) + 2θ(s) f1(s)S˜ LI(t, s,−λ)
+ 2σ(s)
[
σ(s) f3(s)−ρ(s)β(s)] f1(s),
K(t, s) = 2θ(s) f1(s)S˜ LII(t, s,−λ) +σ2(s) f 21 (s),
M(t, s) = 2θ(s) f4(s)
[
ste
∫ s
t r(y)dy + S˜ III(t, s)
]
+ 2stlte
∫ s
t [r(y)+α(y)]dy
[
η(s) + θ(s) f3(s)
]
+ 2stl−λt e
∫ s
t
{
r(y)−λ
[
α(y)− 12 (1+λ)β2(y)
]}
dyθ(s) f1(s) +
[
σ(s) f4(s)
]2.
Thus, we obtain
Et[S 2(T )] = s2t e
2
∫ T
t r(y)dy + S˜ 2I(t,T )Et[L(T )] + S˜ 2II(t,T )Et[L2(T )]
+ S˜ 2III(t,T )Et
[
L−λ(T )
]
+ S˜ 2IV(t,T )Et
[
L−λ+1(T )
]
+ S˜ 2V(t,T )Et
[
L−2λ(T )
]
+ S˜ 2VI(t,T ), (4.8)
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where
S˜ 2I(t,T ) =
∫ T
t
e
∫ T
v [2r(y)−α(y)]dyF(t,v)dv,
S˜ 2II(t,T ) =
∫ T
t
e
∫ T
v
[
2η(y)−β2(y)
]
dyG(t,v)dv,
S˜ 2III(t,T ) =
∫ T
t
e
∫ T
v
{
2r(y)+λ
[
α(y)− 12 (λ+1)β2(y)
]}
dyH(t,v)dv,
S˜ 2IV(t,T ) =
∫ T
t
e
∫ T
v
{
2r(y)+(λ−1)
[
α(y)− 12λβ2(y)
]}
dyJ(t,v)dv,
S˜ 2V(t,T ) =
∫ T
t
e
∫ T
v
{
2r(y)+2λ
[
α(y)− 12 (2λ+1)β2(y)
]}
dyK(t,v)dv,
S˜ 2VI(t,T ) =
∫ T
t
e
∫ T
v 2r(y)dyM(t,v)dv.
In summary, we have the following result.
Proposition 4.1. Let (S ,L) be the solution to the SDE (2.2) with u replaced by the equilibrium
strategy u∗. The equilibrium value function is given by
V(t, (st, lt)) =
1
2
Et
[
S 2(T )
]
− 1
2
(Et [S (T )])2−
(
ω1l−λt +ω2
)
Et [S (T )] ,
where Et [S (T )] and Et
[
S 2(T )
]
are given by (4.6) and (4.8), respectively.
5 Numerical Examples
In this section, we illustrate our results by some numerical examples. The comparisons between
the equilibrium strategy and the pre-committed strategy, and between the equilibrium value function
and the pre-committed optimal value function, are provided in Wei et al. (2012). Recall that we
get the same result with Wei et al. (2012) in a special case. Thus in this paper we do not make the
comparison between our results and the pre-committed strategy. We are concerned with the effect of
the state-dependent risk aversion on the equilibrium strategy.
All the parameters are listed blew:
T = 10, r = 0.1, µ = 0.6, σ = 0.3,
α = 0.1, β = 0.2, ρ = 0.6. λ = 0.5.
In the following figures, three initial time points are chosen, i.e., t = 0,5,8, and the surplus and the
liability are 5 and 3, respectively.
In Figure 5.1, we plot the equilibrium strategy as well as the equilibrium value function versus
ω1 for different ω2. It illustrates that the equilibrium strategy increases as ω1 increases. This is
reasonable, since the risk aversion decreases as ω1 increases and the investor tends to invest more
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into the stock market. The equilibrium value function is a decreasing function of ω1. This implies
that the investor can get higher return by invests boldly (the risk aversion decreases as ω1 increases).
Figure 5.2 illustrates the equilibrium strategy and the equilibrium value function versus ω2 for
different ω1. The curves of the equilibrium strategy and the equilibrium value function show the
same feature as in Figure 5.1.
Appendix
Consider a special case of Wei et al. (2012) with one regime, one bound and one risk asset. The
equilibrium strategy is given by
uˆ(t, s, l) =
β(t)ρ(t)
σ(t)
[
1− e−
∫ T
t r(y)dyb(t)
]
l +
θ(t)
γσ2(t)
e−
∫ T
t r(y)dy,
where b(t) satisfies the linear of ODE:b˙(t) = −
[
α(t)− θ(t)β(t)ρ(t)σ(t)
]
b(t)−
[
η(t) + θ(t)β(t)ρ(t)σ(t)
]
e
∫ T
t r(y)dy,
b(T ) = 0.
The solution to the above ODE is given by
b(t) = e
∫ T
t
[
α(y)− θ(y)β(y)ρ(y)σ(y)
]
dy
∫ T
t
e−
∫ T
z
[
α(y)− θ(y)β(y)ρ(y)σ(y)
]
dy
[
η(z) +
θ(z)β(z)ρ(z)
σ(z)
]
e
∫ T
z r(y)dydz
= e
∫ T
t r(y)dy
∫ T
t
[
η(z) +
θ(z)β(z)ρ(z)
σ(z)
]
e
∫ t
z
[
η(y)+ θ(y)β(y)ρ(y)σ(y)
]
dydz.
Now consider the special case of our model with ω1 = 0. Note that the risk aversion in Wei et al.
(2012) is γ = 1ω2 . Thus we have
f1(t) = 0,
f3(t) =
ρ(t)β(t)
σ(t)
[
1−
∫ T
t
[
η(z) +
θ(z)ρ(z)β(z)
σ(z)
]
e
∫ t
z
[
η(y)+ θ(y)ρ(y)β(y)σ(y)
]
dydz
]
=
ρ(t)β(t)
σ(t)
[
1− e−
∫ T
t r(y)dyb(t)
]
,
f4(t) =
θ(t)
γσ2(t)
e−
∫ T
t r(y)dy.
Thus, in this special case, we get the same equilibrium strategy.
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Figure 5.1: Equilibrium strategy and equilibrium value function versus ω1
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Figure 5.2: Equilibrium strategy and equilibrium value function versus ω2
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